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Abstract
This paper examines the effects of a budget-neutral public spending al-
location between public investment and private investment subsidy on in-
equality dynamics and intergenerational mobility in an environment with
heterogenous households and incomplete capital market.
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1. Introduction
In practically all governments invest in public capital (such as roads, pub-
lic transport, and irrigation), which are used for the production of goods and
services along with private inputs. Most governments also devote consider-
able resources towards subsidising private investment. For instance, in the
UK, until recently, about 35% of universities’ total funding came from the
government.1 In India, the government’s subsidy to agricultural input has
risen by more than ninety times in the last three decades (Fan et al., 2008). In
general, the efficiency implications of productive public spending have been
well studied in growth literature.2 However, it is an open question of how
∗tel.: +44 191 334 5132, fax: +44 191 334 5201.
Email address: yoseph.getachew@durham.ac.uk (Yoseph Yilma Getachew)
1This has helped to keep student tuition fees significantly down. However, now, amid
major budget cuts, the majority of the universities are planning to triple their tuition fees
within the coming years (BBC, June 27, 2011).
2See, for example, Barro (1990), Futagami et al. (1993) and Glomm and Ravikumar
(1994) among many others.
these programs impact the distribution and efficiency of the economy when
they are jointly provided. This paper analytically examines the effects of
a budget-neutral public spending allocation between public investment and
subsidy on inequality dynamics and growth in incomplete capital markets.
The basic intuition behind the theory is as follows: When the credit mar-
kets are imperfect, individuals’ investment opportunities are limited to the
resources they have in hand. The elasticity of substitution between factors
then becomes an important determinant of inequality dynamics and aggre-
gate efficiency due to its impact on individual households’ productivity and
resource constraints. If production at an individual level takes place using
public and private inputs that are substitutable, for instance, an increase in
public investment could relax resource constraints that impede investment
opportunities of poor households. Conversely, if the inputs are complemen-
tary, the rich are the ones who benefit the most from a productivity increase
due to the increase in public investment as they own much of the production
resources in the economy. In this case, rather a subsidy to private invest-
ment benefits the poor, more. The poor have, already, a relatively higher
marginal productivity due to diminishing return to private investment but,
lack resources to take advantage of it.
The next section provides an overlapping generation growth model that
captures this idea. In the model, agents are heterogenous in terms of ini-
tial wealth. Credit markets are missing. The government subsidises private
investment and also invests in public capital. We show that the elasticity
of substitution between public and private factors determines the distribu-
tional effect of a budget-neutral public spending allocation between public
investment and subsidy. If the elasticity of substitution is greater than unity,
an increase in public investment mitigates the persistence of inequality or
speeds up the intergenerational mobility. Conversely, if it is less than unity,
it is rather an increase in subsidy that mitigates inequality persistence. A
higher inequality is also shown to lower growth when the imperfection in the
market prevents the efficient amount of investment to be undertaken in the
economy as in Loury (1981).
This paper, mainly, contributes to the literature of public investment and
growth (see Footnote 2) and inequality and growth with imperfect credit
market (e.g., Loury, 1981; Galor and Zeira, 1993; Benabou, 2002) through
linking productive public spending to inequality and, hence, growth. It is
also related to the limited literature of public investment and distribution
(e.g., Garcia-Penalosa and Turnovsky, 2007; Getachew, 2010). There is also
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a vast literature that studies the relationship between public education and
income distribution, which this paper may also be related to (e.g., Glomm
and Ravikumar, 1992). However, these bodies of literature do not focus on
the allocation of government expenditure.
2. The Model
2.1. Preference and Technology
There is a continuum two-period-lived heterogenous households, in terms
of initial wealth. Agent i who is born at t− 1 enters to the market at t with
kit amount of capital, which is accumulated through her parent’s investment
(eit−1), out of the ”joy of giving”, and public subsidy (e
i
t−1ψ). She employs
this capital in a privately-held firm and earns income.3 She allocates after
tax income ((1− τ) yit) between consumption (c
i
t) and saving (e
i
t).
Agent ith utility function at t is given by,
U
(
cit, k
i
t+1
)
≡ ln cit + β ln k
i
t+1 (1)
subject to the budget constraint,4
cit + e
i
t = y
i
t (1− τ) (2)
The ith offspring capital is given by,
kit+1 = Be
i
t (1 + ψ) (3)
where τ is a fixed flat rate tax; ψ represents the rate the government sub-
sidises private investment.
The production function of the ith firm is general Cobb-Douglas (Re-
vankar, 1971),
yit = A
(
kit
)α
(Gt)
1−α + ǫGt (4)
3A similar type of individual entrepreneurship is used in Benabou (2002) and Angeletos
and Calvet (2006).
4A unitary intertemporal elasticity of substitution utility function and altruistic agents
with a ”joy of giving” motive are common in growth literature (see, for instance, Glomm
and Ravikumar, 1992 and Galor and Zeira, 1993).
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where Gt denotes public capital and ǫ is a parameter.
5 (4) has both the
technological flexibility and tractability that combine the important charac-
teristics of the CES (of Arrow et. al., 1961) and Cobb-Douglas, respectively.
Similar to the latter, we can easily aggregate it:
yt = A (kt)
α (Gt)
1−α exp
(
0.5σ2tα (α− 1)
)
+ ǫGt (5)
where yt ≡
∫
i
yit and kt ≡
∫
i
kit.
6 Similar to the former, the elasticity of
substitution (δ) is different from unity:
δt = 1 + ǫ
α
1− α
Gt
yt
(6)
The sign of ǫ determines δt: When ǫ = 0, the production function is
reduced to the specific Cobb-Douglas. But, in general, if ǫ T 0, then δt T 1.
When ǫ 6= 0, and the output-capital ratio is constant – typical to Ak growth
models, it features a constant elasticity of substitution.7
The government has a balanced budget:
τ
∫
i
yit = ψ
∫
i
eit + I
g
t (7)
where
Gt+1 ≡ I
g
t = (1− θ) τ
∫
i
yit (8)
ψ
∫
i
eit = θτ
∫
i
yit (9)
and, Igt and θ denote public investment and the fraction of government rev-
enue that goes to investment subsidy respectively. We, thus, assume complete
depreciation of the capital stock.
The ith individual of generation t optimisation problem, from (1), (2)
and (3), is given by
5The marginal product of ki
t
is always nonnegative under the standard assumption
0 < α < 1. But, the production function has nonnegative marginal product of Gt when ǫ
has a lower bound, ǫ > yt (α− 1) /Gt. See Revankar (1971) for details.
6See Appendix A for details on the aggregation.
7Note that, the main results do not depend on the use of specific production function.
In fact, any neoclassical production function, with a factor elasticity of substitution dif-
ferent from unity, may lead to the same result as far as one can deal with aggregation.
Results based on the CES (of Arrow et. al., 1961) production function, with a log-linear
approximation, are available from the author upon request.
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max
ei
t
ln
(
(1− τ) yit − e
i
t
)
+ β
[
lnB (1 + ψ) eit
]
taking as given τ , θ, kit and Gt+1. The FOC gives,
eit = a(1− τ)y
i
t (10)
where a ≡ β/ (1 + β). (10) is agent ith optimal saving as a fraction of her
after tax income, which is standard. From (9) and (10), following Benabou
(2002), we obtain,
ψ = θτ/ (a (1− τ)) (11)
3. Inequality persistence and capital dynamics
The dynamics of private capital at an individual level is given by, from
(3), (4), (10) and (11),
kit+1 = B (a(1− τ) + θτ)Gt
(
A
(
ϕit
)α
+ ǫ
)
(12)
from which the aggregate capital is obtained,
kt+1 ≡
∫
i
kit+1 = B (a(1− τ) + θτ)Gt
(
A (ϕt)
α exp
(
0.5σ2tα (α− 1)
)
+ ǫ
)
(13)
where ϕit ≡ k
i
t/Gt, ϕt ≡ kt/Gt and ϕ ≡ k/G.
8
From (5) and (8), the public capital dynamics is given by,
Gt+1 = (1− θ) τGt
(
A (ϕt)
α exp
(
0.5σ2tα (α− 1)
)
+ ǫ
)
(14)
Note that, inequality at t has a negative impact on aggregate private and
public capital at t+ 1 as ∂kt+1/∂σ
2
t < 0 and ∂Gt+1/∂σ
2
t < 0.
Then, the aggregate capital ratio is easily computed from (13) and (14),
ϕt+1 = ϕ = B (a(1− τ) + θτ) / ((1− θ) τ) (15)
8See Appendix A.
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Thus, the private-public capital ratio (ϕ) and, hence, the output-capital ra-
tios are constant during transition and at equilibrium,9 as typical to Ak
growth models.
It is straightforward that a higher θ increases ϕ. On the other hand, a
higher τ increases public investment. But, τ also distorts private investment
although, it increases the government’s subsidy rate (ψ). The net effect is
that ϕ is lower when τ is large.
By taking the variance of (12), we get the dynamics of inequality:
σ2t+1 = ln
((
exp
(
α2σ2t
)
− 1
) (
ω
(
ϕ, σ2t
)
/
(
ω
(
ϕ, σ2t
)
+ ǫ
))2
+ 1
)
(16)
where ω (ϕ, σ2t ) ≡ Aϕ
α exp (0.5σ2tα (α− 1)).
10 Note that, if ǫ = 0, the Cobb-
Douglas case (δ = 1), then (16) reduces to σ2t+1 = α
2σ2t . In this case, the
dynamics of inequality is independent of the capital ratio and any of the
policy parameters.
We can rewrite (16) after substituting ϕ from (15),
σ2t+1 = ln
((
exp
(
α2σ2t
)
− 1
) (
ω
(
τ ,θ, σ2t
)
/
(
ω
(
τ ,θ, σ2t
)
+ ǫ
))2
+ 1
)
(17)
redefining ω (τ , θ, σ2t ) ≡ A (B (a(1− τ) + θτ) / ((1− θ) τ))
α exp (0.5σ2tα (α− 1)).
Therefore, the dynamics of inequality depends on the policy parameters τ
and θ when δ 6= 1.
Proposition 1. From (16) and (17), if δ > 1 (δ < 1), the persistence of
inequality is lower the higher (the lower) is the public spending GDP ratio τ ,
the lower (the higher) is the private-public capital ratio ϕ and/or the lower
(the higher) is the subsidy rate θ.
Proof. First, recall that if ǫ T 0, δ T 1. Then, from (16), one sees that
∂σ2t+1/∂ϕ ≷ 0 if ǫ ≷ 0. And, from (17), ∂σ2t+1/∂τ ≶ 0 or ∂σ2t+1/∂θ ≷ 0 if
ǫ ≷ 0.
9To see this, first divide (5) by kt or Gt, and then, use (15).
10See Appendix B for details on the derivation.
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4. Growth rate
From (14) and (15), one obtains the growth rate of the economy,
Gt+1/Gt ≡ γt+1 + 1 = (1− θ) τ
(
Aϕα exp
(
0.5σ2tα (α− 1)
)
+ ǫ
)
(18)
Thus, σ2t has an effect on the growth rate during transition. Consider-
ing ∂γt+1/∂σ
2
t < 0, a higher inequality lowers growth. Moreover, a higher
elasticity of substitution leads to a higher growth, as in Klump and de la
Grandville (2000). Similar to the literature in public capital and growth
(e.g., Barro 1990), public investment affects growth directly through its ef-
fect on the productivity of private capital. In contrast, it also affects growth
indirectly through an effect on the distribution dynamics (σ2t ).
However, as we see soon, the inequality will be vanished (σ2 = 0) in the
long run and, hence, γ + 1 = (1− θ) τ (Aϕα + ǫ). Thus, the effect of policy
on the steady-state growth is limited to the standard productivity effect.
5. Steady-state inequality
The steady-state distribution is, from (17),
exp
(
σ2
)
− 1 =
(
exp
(
α2σ2
)
− 1
) (
ω
(
ϕ, σ2
)
/
(
ω
(
ϕ, σ2
)
+ ǫ
))2
(19)
Eq. (19) is satisfied only if σ2 = 0. This is intuitive: There are no factors
(such as an uninsured idiosyncratic shock) in this model that lead to a non-
degenerate distribution of wealth. Individuals with relatively lower kit rapidly
accumulate wealth due to their relatively high marginal productivity, which,
in turn, due to diminishing returns to investment. Therefore, the economy
features declining wealth mobility along the transition to a steady-state.
6. Conclusion
The paper has examined how the allocation of government expenditure
between public investment and private investment subsidy affects inequal-
ity dynamics in an economy with heterogenous agents and incomplete credit
market. It has argued that if public and private factors are substitutable
(complementary), increased spending on public investment (private invest-
ment subsidy) may lead to declining inequality dynamics.
7
Appendix A. Aggregation
With respect to aggregating (4), note first that,
yt ≡
∫
i
yit = E
[
yit
]
= A (Gt)
1−α E
[(
kit
)α]
+ ǫGt (Appendix A.1)
Considering ln kit ∼ N (µ, σ
2
t ), then E
[
(kit)
α]
is computed as follows:
ln E
[(
kit
)α]
= E
[
ln
(
kit
)α]
+ 0.5 var
[
ln
(
kit
)α]
= αE
[
ln
(
kit
)]
+ 0.5α2σ2t
= α
(
ln E
[
kit
]
− 0.5σ2t
)
+ 0.5α2σ2t
= ln (kt)
α + 0.5σ2tα (α− 1) (Appendix A.2)
Finally, substitute (A.2) into (A.1) to obtain (5). We aggregate (12) similarly.
Appendix B. Distribution dynamics
To derive the distribution dynamics in (16), we take the variance from
both side of (12) to obtain,
var
(
kit+1
)
= (B (a(1− τ) + θτ)AGt)
2 var
[(
ϕit
)α]
(Appendix B.1)
Then, based on the normal-lognormal distribution relationship,
var
(
kit+1
)
= exp
(
2E
[
ln kit+1
]) (
exp
(
σ2t+1
) (
exp
(
σ2t+1
)
− 1
))
= (kt+1)
2
(
exp
(
σ2t+1
)
− 1
)
(Appendix B.2)
We used the fact that E
[
ln kit+1
]
= lnE
[
kit+1
]
− 1
2
σ2t+1.
Similarly,
var
[(
ϕit
)α]
= exp
(
2αE
[
lnϕit
]) (
exp
(
σ2tα
2
) (
exp
(
σ2tα
2
)
− 1
))
= (ϕt)
2α
(
exp
(
σ2tα (α− 1)
) (
exp
(
σ2tα
2
)
− 1
))
(Appendix B.3)
Combining (B.1), (B.2) and (B.3), we obtain
(kt+1)
2
(
exp
(
σ2t+1
)
− 1
)
= (B (a(1− τ) + θτ)AGt)
2
(ϕt)
2α
(
exp
(
σ2tα (α− 1)
) (
exp
(
σ2tα
2
)
− 1
))
(Appendix B.4)
Substituting (13) into (B.4), and after some manipulation, we obtain (16).
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